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ARGUMENT

A WARRANTLESS ENTRY BY AN OFFICER INTO A PRIVATE RESIDENCE IS
LEGALLY JUSTIFIED WHEN A PUBLIC OFFENSE COMMITTED IN THE
RESIDENCE IS COMMITTED TtfTHE OFFICER'S PRESENCE. ~ ~
Utah statute allows a peace officer to make an arrest without a warrant("lor any
public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer." Utah Code
§77-7-2. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned that "the term public offense, in view of
other provisions in the statute, necessarily includes every piiblic offense constituting a
misdemeanor." Oleson v PincocL 251 P 23 (Utah 1926).
Pursuant to Utah statute or Brigham City Code, the Class B Misdemeanor of
assault occurs when an individual makes-"an attempt with unlawful force or violence, ten*
do bodily injury to another; or an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." Utah Code §76-5-102
and Section 76-5-102, Title 15, Brigham City Code. In this case, the trial court found
that the peace officer had probable cause to enter the backyard of the residence because
he observed two juveniles consuming alcoholic beverages. Addendum #1 to Brief of
Appellant. Then, "upon entering the backyard, the officers observed, through windows
and a screen door, an altercation taking place wherein it appeared that four adults were
trying to control a juvenile. At one point, the juvenile got his hand loose and snnkked
one of the occupants of the residence in the nose" Addendum #1 to Brief of Appellant
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From the officer's experience and training, he could reasonably deduce that the
juvenile used unlawful force and violence when he struck one of the adults in the face.
Additionally, the officer had no doubt that the juvenile's force or violence had caused
bodily injury to another by bloodying the adult's nose. Therefore, because the officer
observed every element of the crime of assault being committed in his presence, Utah
state statute justified his entry into the residence to make an arrest.
Additionally, pursuant to Utah statute, "An actor commits unlawful detention if
the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and against the will of the
victim, detains or restrains the victim. . . . " Utah Code §76-5-304. While in the backyard
the peace officers observed, through window, through windows and a screen door, four
adults pushing "the teenager up against a refrigerator, holding his arms and yelling at
him, while the juvenile was struggling wildly to get free and yelling back at the adults."
See transcript at page 21, line 24 through page 22 line 5.
The officer had probable cause to believe that all four adults did not have authority
of law to push the teenager up against the refrigerator while holding his amis and yelling
at him. Additionally, the officer could also deduce that the juvenile was being detained
or restrained against his will. Therefore, from the officer's position in the backyard he
had sufficient probable cause to believe that the Class B Misdemeanor of unlawful
detention was being committed inside the home.
Therefore, at least two separate public offenses were committed or attempted in
the presence of the peace officer. Therefore, pursuant to Utah Code §77-7-2 the officer
6

was legally justified in making an arrest without a warrant. Additionally, this rule, that
officers may arrest without a warrant for misdemeanors committed in their presence,
applies to misdemeanors committed within a private residence and yet observable by the
police officers.
"A peace officer may, without invitation, enter 'a house or like structure or
enclosure in private ownership where the circumstances are such as to give him
knowledge through the report of his senses that a breach of the peace or other
misdemeanor is being committed or attempted, and there to arrest the offenders for such
crime.'" State v McGuire, 479 P.2d 187(Ariz. Ct. App. 1971) (quoting Adair v Williams.
210 P 853 (Arizona 1922)). Additionally, "an officer may enter a house or premises
without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant, or warrant of arrest, where he hears
or sees a disturbance therein, or where it is detected by his natural senses . . . and as a
result of such entrance he may make a lawful arrest after entering." Duffy v State, 153
P.2d 629 (Oklahoma 1944).
In a recent opinion, the Maryland Court of Appeals quoted the Maryland Supreme
Court as holding "that it is lawful for a police officer without a warrant to enter and
search a dwelling when he can see from the outside that a crime is being committed."
Dunnuck v. State ofMaryland. 786 A.2d 695, (Maryland Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Griffin
v. State. 92 A.2d 743, 745 (1952), cert, denied, 345 U.S. 907, 73 S. Ct. 647, 97 L. Ed.
1343 (1953)), The Dunnuck Court also noted an additional holding of the Appellate
Court that ,fa valid visual observation ... furnishes probable cause for... the warrantless
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entry to effect an arrest for a crime being committed in the officer's presence." Dunnuck
v. State of Maryland, 786 A.2d 695, (Maryland Ct. App. 2001) (quoting State v. Brown.
292 A.2d 762, 774 (1972). The Griffin v State court also added that "in deciding whether
an officer was justified in making an arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor, the
criteria is whether the circumstances presented to the officer through his senses were
sufficient to justify a sincere belief that the accused was committing the misdemeanor in
his presence." Griffin v State, 92 A.2d 743.
For purposes of Utah Code, "presence" of the officer "includes all of the physical
senses or any devise that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense,
or records the observations of any of the physical senses." Additionally, the Supreme
Court of Nevada, quoting the Supreme Court of Georgia, stated that "it is a general
principal that an offense is considered to be committed "in the view" or "in the presence"
of an officer where any of his senses afford him knowledge that an offense is being
committed." State v. Smithson, 19 P.2d 631 (Nevada 1933)(quoting Ramsey v State, 17
S.E. 613, 615)(Sup.Ct. Georgia). "Therefore, an officer on the street, who hears the noise
of an assault or an affray in a house, is justified in entering and making an arrest for a
breach of the peace, although all is quiet when he enters the rooms whence the sounds
preceded." IdL "In such a case the breach of the peace occurs "in the presence" of the
officer within the meaning of the law." Id
The officers testified that "from the front of the residence [they] could hear noises
and loud voices which appeared to indicate, in their training and experience, a physical
8

and oral altercation occurring in the rear of the residence/' Transcript at page 8, lines 19
through 22 and page 10, lines 3 through 9. Therefore, as a result of these audible
observations alone, the officers were legally justified in entering the backyard, and would
have been justified in entering the residence. However, because once in the backyard, the
public offences in this case were committed in the officer's presence, including both his
auditory and visual observation of the offense, the great weight of case law and state
statute demonstrates that the officer was both legally justified and legally obligated to
enter the residence and put a stop to the affray.

EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED WHICH JUSTIFIED THE
OFFICERS' WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO THE PREMISES.

A warrantless entry into a private residence is legally justified when there are
exigent circumstances and when probable cause exists, the "Exigent Circumstances"
exception. United States v Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992) "Exigent
circumstances" are those "that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . .
was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of
relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah
App. 1993).
In this case, the officer testified that he observed four adults pushing one teenager
9

up against a refrigerator while holding his arms and yelling at him. Transcript at page
21, line 15-22. At the same time the officers observed the juvenile struggling wildly to
get free and yelling back at the adults. Transcript at page 21, line 24 through page 22
line 5. The trial court also foundthat at one point during this violent altercation "the
juvenile got his hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the
nose." Addendum #1 to Brief of Appellant. The officer then testified that after the
juvenile struck the adult, the altercation escalated, with more struggling and yelling.
Transcript at page 43, lines 14 through 25 and page 51, lines 10 through 21. This
violent altercation, escalating in seriousness and magnitude, clearly fits the definition of
exigent circumstances in that observing the altercation "would cause a reasonable person
to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to . . . other persons."
State v Beavers. 859 P.2d at 18.
When an appellate court reviews a finding regarding exigent circumstances, its
task is to review the totality of the facts and circumstances to determine if a finding of
exigent circumstances was proper. State v Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).
Additionally, the determination as to whether exigent circumstances existed must be
based on the officer's reasonable belief. State v Beavers. 859 P.2d at 18.
Appellees brief attempts to convince the court that the only threat of harm or
violence in the home was a simple "smack" on the nose. However, a review of the
totality of the facts shows clearly that the officer personally observed a violent altercation
between five people in the residence. As four adults were attempting to restrain a
10

juvenile, the juvenile got one hand free and hit one of the four adults in the nose causing
it to bleed. After such hitting, the struggling and yelling escalated, and the threat of
additional violence increased. Therefore, the officer could reasonably believe that his
warrantless entry into the private residence was necessaryio-prevent the physical harm of
other persons. The officer's reasonable belief, derived from his personal observations of
the violent altercation, fits squarely within the definition of exigent circumstances and it
was therefore improper for the trial court to find that no exigent circumstances existed
which would justify the officer's entry into the residence.

THE SITUATION PERSONALLY OBSERVED BY THE OFFICER PRIOR TO HIS
ENTRY INTO THE RESIDENCE CONSTITUTED EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
AND NOT A MINOR OFFENSE

Appellees cite Wells v Wisconsin for the proposition that the Class B
Misdemeanor of assault is a "minor offense" which would not trigger the exigent
circumstances exception. Wells v Wisconsin. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). In Wells v Wisconsin.
after driving his car erratically, petitioner swerved off the road and came to a stop in a
field without causing damage to any person or property. IcL at 740. Petitioner then
walked away from the scene of the accident, ignoring suggestions to the contrary from
witnesses. LcL When the police arrived, they were told by witnesses that the driver of the
vehicle was either very drunk or very sick and that he had left the scene. I d "After
11

checking the car's registration, the police, without obtaining a warrant, proceeded to the
petitioner's nearby home." I d After gaining entry and finding the petitioner lying in bed,
they arrested petitioner for driving a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant in
violation of Wisconsin Statute. Id.
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the Appellate Court's conclusion that
"The warrantless arrest of petitioner in his home violated the Fourth Amendment because
the State, although demonstrating probable cause to arrest, had not established the
existence of exigent circumstances." Id At 747. The Supreme Court cites three reasons
for finding that the facts of this case do not trigger the exigent circumstances exception.
First, the Court notes that an exception to the warrant requirement is appropriate
when officers are dealing with "threats or crimes of violence which endanger life or
security." Id at 751. Second, the Supreme Court reasoned that petitioner wras no longer a
danger to himself or others. The Court noted that "petitioner had already arrived home,
and had abandoned his car at the scene of the accident, there was little remaining threat to
the public safety." I d at 753. The third and final reason the Supreme Court found that
this offense did not rise to the level of exigent circumstances was that "the State of
Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which no imprisonment is possible." I d at 754
(citing Wis. Stat. 346. 65(2)(1975); 346. 65(2)(a)(Supp. 1983 through 1984)). The
Supreme Court noted the fact that a first offense DUI was classified merely as an
infraction with no imprisonment possible was the best indication that the offense was
12

minor and did not rise to the level of exigent circumstances. Wells v Wisconsin 466 U.S.
at 754.
The facts in the case at hand differ greatly from the facts in Wells v Wisconsin.
First, unlike the situation in Wells v. Wisconsin, the case at hand involved specific and
observable threats and crimes of violence. The officer observed a violent altercation
between five individuals, where one individual was hit in the face. After such hitting, the
struggling and yelling escalated, and the threat of additional violence increased. Second,
there was no remaining threat to public safety at the time of the arrest in Wells v
Wisconsin. In this case, the threats and crimes of violence were occurring in the very
presence of the officer and continued to occur even after the officer entered the residence.
Finally, where the offense in Wells v Wisconsin was classified as an infraction with no
imprisonment possible, the observable misdemeanors in this case were Class B
Misdemeanors with a maximum possible penalty of $1,850.00 in fines and up to 180
days imprisonment.
Therefore, a review of the three important tests for exigent circumstances listed by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Wells v. Wisconsin, clearly demonstrates that exigent
circumstances existed in this case that justified the officer's warrantless entry.
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has said that warrantless entries into a private
residence are justified under the exigent circumstance exception to prevent "physical
harm to the officers or other persons...." State v Beavers 859 P.2d at 13. In the case at
hand, the officer personally observed serious physical harm being inflicted on a person.
13

Additionally, contrary to Appellees' assertion, after one of the adults was assaulted, the
violence and tumult continued to escalate. Indeed all of the evidence on the record shows
that the exigent circumstance tests from both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Utah
Supreme Court were met in the case at hand. There were (1) threats and crimes of
violence, (2) occurring at the time of the officer's warrantless entry and (3) such crimes
are serious public offenses. Therefore, because exigent circumstances existed, the officer
was justified in his warrantless entry into the residence.

SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO JUSTIFY A
WARRANTLESS ENTRY
As stated above, probable cause is generally found where there is a "fair
probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found" State v. Nguyen, 878 P.2d 1183,
1187 (Utah App. 1994). Additionally, Appellees argue that the test for probable cause is
"that there must be a showing that the officers had the requisite probable cause and could
have gotten a warrant." See Brief of Appellee, page 11.
Pursuant to the trial court's findings of fact, "Upon entering the backyard, the
officers observed through windows and a screen door, an altercation taking place,
wherein it appeared that four adults were trying to control a juvenile. At one point, the
juvenile got a hand loose and smacked one of the occupants of the residence in the nose."
Addendum #1 to Brief ofAppellant. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-5-102, an
assault is "an attempt with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
14

an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another." Therefore, as the officer observed an individual commit
every element of the crime of assault, there is no question that there is a "fair probability"
that evidence of such crime would be foundupDn his entry.
Additionally, pursuant to his personal observation of the violent physical
altercation occurring in the home, the officer also had probable cause to believe that the
crime of unlawful detention was occurring in the home. "An actor commits unlawful
detention if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and against the
will of the victim, detains or restrains the victim...." Utah Code §76-5-304. After
witnessing the assault or unlawful detention, it was clear to the officer that the four adults
were not able to control the situation as the officer observed the violence of the situation
escalate.
Therefore, where the officer had probable cause to believe that at least one
misdemeanor occurred in his presence, he could be sure that he would find evidence of
such crimes upon his entry into the home. Additionally, There is no question that the
officer could have acquired a warrant to arrest an individual when he witnessed that
individual commit an assault, a Class B Misdemeanor, in his presence.1 The officer also
had sufficient probable cause to believe that additional crimes would be committed in the
home and in his presence if he did not enter the home and take control of the situation.

Appellant acknowledges that a warrant would not have been required in this case by Utah Statute,
Appellant merely seeks here to show that the second prong of the "Exigent Circumstance" exception has been met,
inasmuch as the officer would have had sufficient evidence to secure a warrant had he attempted to secure one.
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the trial courts findings of fact, the trial court committed error in
finding that the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution precluded the officer's
warrantless entry into the residence. A warrantless entry by an officer into a private
residence is legally justified when a public offense committed in the residence is
committed in the presence of the officer. As discussed above, in this case, public
offenses were committed in the residence and in the presence of the officer. Additionally,
a warrantless entry by an officer into a private residence is legally justified when exigent
circumstances and probable cause exist. Based upon the trial court's findings, both
exigent circumstances and probable cause existed in this case. Therefore, because both of
these exceptions to^the warrantless entry requirement exist in this case, the trial court
should have found that the warrantless entry of the officer into the private residence was
legally justified.

Therefore, the trial court's Order granting Defendants' Motion to Suppress should
be overturned, and Defendants' Motion to Suppress should be denied.
DATED this /!> day of April, 2002.
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

Leonard J. Carson
Attorneys for Appellant
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